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It is a widely-shared view that values are essentially linked to or dependent on 
emotions. Call this view the Dependence Thesis. Here are some general statements of the 
Dependence Thesis:  
 
“The claim is that evaluation, and in particular moral evaluation, is somehow 
grounded in human sentiment.” (D’Arms & Jacobson 2000, 722)  
“[A]ccording to many philosophies value is to be understood in terms of 
emotions.” (Mulligan 2010, 475)  
“The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and actions 
amiable or odious, praise-worthy or blameable; that which stamps on them 
the mark of honour or infamy, approbation or censure… depends on some 
internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole 
species.” (Hume 1975, 173)  
 
These statements reveal little about the exact nature of the supposed link between values and 
emotions. What I am interested in this paper are the epistemic aspects of this link. For even if 
one believes that emotions present or give access to values, and believes further that this is a 
crucial fact about both emotions and values, one can ask how reliable or trustworthy 
emotional presentations of values may be. It could even be true that emotions provide what 
is in some sense a unique or privileged access to evaluative properties while not presenting 
these properties in a particularly reliable or trustworthy fashion. 
 
In this paper, I intend to approach this epistemic issue by asking two related questions. 
First, how exactly do emotions latch onto or track values? And second, how well suited are 
emotions to detecting, learning or finding out about values?  
 
To answer the first question, I will put forward what I call the heuristics-model of 
emotions. This is a model of emotions as a sui generis biological system subserving 
heuristic functions. It is meant to provide the basic framework for understanding the 
epistemic role of emotions with regard to value. This model is used then to answer the 
second question. If emotions are indeed heuristics of value, then it follows that emotions 
can be an important and useful source of information about value. Moreover, they will 
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also be special in terms of how they deliver that information about value. However, they 
will not be epistemically superior in the sense that emotions will not be the highest court 
of appeal for the justification of axiological beliefs. 
 
Call the highest-court-of-appeal-view the Epistemic Dependence Thesis (EDT). The 
negative objective of this paper is to reject EDT as here defined. The positive objective is 
to defend the heuristics-model. Further, I hope to show that EDT is incompatible with the 




I will begin with the positive objective proceeding as follows. In Section 2, I will present 
the heuristics-model of emotions. Then Section 3 will review empirical evidence bearing 
on the heuristics-model. I will argue that this evidence supports the heuristics-model or at 
the very least does not appear to be inconsistent with it. 
 
Section 4 begins to tackle the negative objective by making EDT more precise. It will be 
seen that this clarification is important because EDT, which I take to be the highest-court-
of-appeal-view, is easily confused with different ideas regarding emotions as an epistemic 
resource such as, for example, that emotions are statistically more likely to be correct than 
evaluative beliefs. It will be shown that the heuristics-model is not incompatible with the 
latter view and can even be read as positively supporting it. It is EDT properly understood, 
namely as the highest-court-of-appeal-view, that I seek to reject and that I take the 
heuristics-model to be incompatible with. 
 
Having thus clarified EDT and its relation to the heuristics-model, I will go on in Section 5 
to apply the heuristics-model to celebrated cases from the philosophy of emotions 
literature. I argue that while the heuristics-model offers a good explanation of what goes in 
such cases, advocates of EDT (properly understood) will have a hard time accounting for 
the same phenomena. I will also try to show that the conclusions drawn from special cases 
generalize. The conclusion of the paper serves to demonstrate that skepticism about EDT 
is compatible with a continued emphasis on the importance of emotions in first-order 
normative ethics. 
 
                                                        
1 Of course, some may doubt EDT without accepting the heuristics-model. I believe that some of the 
arguments to be put forward in the following will appeal to these people as well. 
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2 The emotions-as-heuristics hypothesis  
 
As the basic framework for understanding the epistemic function of emotions with regard 
to value, I propose to model emotions as a complex sui generis biological system 
subserving heuristic functions. I will call this the emotions-as-heuristics-hypothesis and 
the corresponding model the heuristics-model of emotions.  
 
Heuristics are mental short cuts or rules of thumb. What makes heuristics special from an 
epistemic point of view is how they work. The basic underlying mechanism of heuristics-
based thought-processes is substitution. The “target attribute” is substituted by 
a “heuristic attribute” which is easier to handle (Kahneman & Frederick 2002). The 
epistemic task is carried out using this heuristic attribute rather than the original target 
attribute.  
 
The mechanism of substitution enables rapid reactions when time and information are 
scarce: heuristics-based thinking is “fast and frugal” (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). These 
reactions are perfectly adequate to and adaptive in many natural and social environments so 
heuristics tend to work well in many cases, sometimes even significantly outperforming 
systematic, all-things-considered judgements (Gigerenzer & Goldstein 1996; Czerlinski, 
Gigerenzer & Goldstein 1999). However, when overgeneralized, heuristics can lead to 
flagrant errors of fact as well as to unacceptable normative judgments in various legal, 
moral, political and other practical contexts (Sunstein 2003; Sunstein 2005; Kahneman 
2011).  
 
To offer just a simple example, in assessing the risk of travelling by plane many people 
rely on the “availability heuristic” (Sunstein 2005, 532).
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That is, people think about the 
dangers of flying on the basis of widely reported and therefore memorable examples of 
airplane crashes instead of relying on statistical figures (sometimes even when these figures are 
readily available and sometimes even after having consulted these figures). In short, they 
substitute salience and familiarity for frequency and so they reach a false conclusion as 
regards the likelihood of plane crashes.  
 
In agreement with most of the literature, I use the term “heuristic” quite 
comprehensively here. This usage is comprehensive in two senses. First, it can cover all 
kinds of thought-processes that differ from controlled, reflective reasoning and make use of 
                                                        
2 Other basic heuristics are “representativeness” and “anchoring”, see Sunstein 2003, 752 summarizing the 
seminal works on the subject by Kahneman and Tversky. 
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the mechanism of substitution.
3
 The difference is manifested in a number of empirical 
characteristics. Heuristic thought-processes are said to be “spontaneous, intuitive, effortless, 
and fast” whereas reflective thinking is “deliberate, rule-governed, effortful, and slow” 
(Kahneman & Frederick 2002, 49).
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 According to dual-process theories, these two ways of 
thinking stand for two distinct cognitive systems (System 1 and System 2) with 
different evolutionary histories and neural architectures (Damasio 1994; De Sousa 2010; 
Kahneman 2011).  
 
Second, the usage is comprehensive in that it refers to “inferences about unknown aspects 
of the environment” based on information from one’s memory and/or from one’s 
environment (Gigerenzer & Goldstein 1996, 650, 653) as well as more generally to 
“decision-making processes that reliably generate rational behaviour in relevant 
environments” (Hurley 2005, 587). In short, heuristics are specific epistemic procedures that 
generate reasons for beliefs, both evaluative and factual.  
 
All in all, therefore, a “heuristics-heuristic” may work best to identify heuristics: we are 
dealing with a heuristic whenever “a difficult question is answered by substituting an 
answer to an easier one” (Kahneman & Frederick 2002, 50).
5
 Now, my suggestion is that 
the epistemic function of emotions with regard to value is heuristical. That is, 
characteristic emotional responses — fear, anger, guilt, blame, indignation, etc. — are used 
as mental short cuts in normative evaluations. This is the gist of the heuristics-hypothesis. 
 
Take guilt, for example. In terms of the heuristics-hypothesis, guilt is a heuristic which 
functions as follows: if I feel guilt about what I have done I will typically move to the 
conclusion that I must have done wrong. I will do so in a rapid, spontaneous and effortless 
manner. In short, my feeling of guilt will be an important heuristic cue when I 
normatively evaluate my action. The main reason for relying on this heuristic cue is the 




                                                        
3 So this usage leaves room for a more elaborate taxonomy of different sub-categories of heuristics (see Weber 
& Ancker 2005, 563): narrative heuristics, affective heuristics, etc. 
4 There is room for debate about how essential these characteristics are. For example, reflective thinking can 
be extremely fast and sometimes quite effortless and spontaneous. 
5 However, it is important to steer clear of two potential pitfalls. First, heuristics-based thinking should not be 
contrasted with consequentialist or utilitarian thinking. A consequentialist or utilitarian approach can be 
heuristics-based or use reflective reasoning, and so can a deontological approach. The distinction between the 
two kinds of thought-processes is content-neutral. Second, whether a thought-process is rule-governed or not is 
orthogonal to whether it is heuristics-based or reflective. Heuristics can be rules, but need not be. And 
conversely, reflective thinking can rely on rules and principles. An important consequence of this is that moral 
principles are not necessarily heuristics, pace Bartsch & Wright 2005. 
6 It may be objected that this example is problematic because the feeling of guilt more often follows the belief 
that I have done wrong than the other way round. I seriously doubt whether this true as a matter of empirical 
fact. Whatever the case may be, as I make it clear in Section 3.1 below, the heuristics-hypothesis can easily 
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3 Defending the heuristics-model: empirical 
findings 
 
The heuristics-model is both philosophically plausible and is consistent with empirical 
scientific evidence. I will now summarize the evidence coming from empirically-oriented 
emotion research at the intersection of psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, and 
evolutionary anthropology. However, we also have reason to adopt the heuristics-model 
because it offers the right framework to characterize the epistemic link between emotion 
and value. I will go on to discuss these philosophical issues in Sections 4 and 5.
7  
 
3.1 Experimental psychology  
 
It has been repeatedly demonstrated that affective valence associated with objects or events 
will substantially influence people’s judgments and decisions regarding those objects or 
events (Murphy & Zajonc 1993). These findings show that affect influences judgments, 
preferences and choices whether or not the affect is consciously felt, and even if the 
affective state in question is a mere emotional arousal involving no discernible cognitive 
activity (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc 1980; Zajonc 1980).  
 
Although the finding that emotions need not involve any cognitive activity — let alone 
structured evaluative judgments (pace Nussbaum 2001) — has important philosophical 
implications (see Prinz 2004),
8
 the idea in itself that emotions and other affective states can 
influence reason is an age-old commonplace. More novel is evidence that when people make 
judgments or decisions they directly rely on their emotions for information and evaluative 
cues (Damasio 1994; Slovic et al. 2002; Sunstein 2003).  
 
This finding can account for various at first sight puzzling patterns of behaviour. For 
example, it has been suggested that people use affective tagging to render information 
meaningful. If some piece of information attracts no emotional response, then people will 
find it difficult to assess its importance and relevance. Among others, this could explain 
                                                                                                                                                       
accommodate the fact that emotional reactions sometimes follow upon evaluative judgments rather than 
precede them.  
7 Naturally, the relationship between empirical emotion research and the philosophy of emotion is a two-way 
street, see Prinz 2004, 26-30; De Sousa 2010; Perler 2011, 11-13. 
8 This view is sometimes referred to as the affective primacy paradigm. It is important to note that the 
heuristics-model defended here is not dependent on the truth or falsity of this paradigm. I will come back to 
this point later on. 
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people’s often peculiar attitudes towards risk and probability as well as their surprising 
assessments of potential outcomes when deciding on future policies (Finucane et al. 2000).  
 
Thus people are notoriously insensitive to distant or slowly accumulating dangers — 
banally but powerfully demonstrated by the case of smoking. It is argued that this is because 
these remote threats elicit no affective responses and so we find it difficult to factor them into 
our deliberative processes. By the same token, if a certain possible outcome triggers an 
immediate and intense emotional response, then it will loom very large in our thinking 
about what course of action to choose regardless of how this outcome otherwise compares 
with other outcomes in terms of probability, risk and potential benefits. To quote only 
one of many convergent findings, it was observed that people’s perceptions of risk and 
risk-controlling policies were “strongly linked to the degree to which a hazard evoked 
feelings of dread. Activities associated with cancer are seen as riskier and more in need of 
regulation than activities associated with less dreaded forms of illness, injury, and death 
(e.g., accidents).” (Slovic et al. 2002, 410). It has also been observed that time-pressure 
increases the tendency to rely on such emotion-based assessments instead of reflective 
evaluations (Finucane et al. 2000; Slovic et al. 2002). This is exactly what the heuristics-
model would predict.  
 
There is evidence too that characteristic kinds of emotional responses play such a heuristic 
role in more narrowly normative and moral evaluations and decisions as well. For 
example, it has been found that people’s views on appropriate punishment (in terms of 
severity, etc.) for wrongdoing is governed by a so-called “outrage heuristic” which 
dictates that “penalties should be a proportional response to the outrageousness of the act” 
(Sunstein 2005, 538; see also Kahneman & Frederick 2002, 49, 63). Similarly, a 
“revulsion heuristic” frequently governs people’s responses to questions of sexual 
morality. We could call this an “it’s just disgusting!” heuristic (Sunstein 2005, 540). In 
fact, the impact of revulsion can be so strong that it can outweigh even one’s best judgment 
to the contrary as cases of “moral dumbfounding” show (Haidt 2001, 814).  
 
It is safe to predict that other emotions play similar heuristic functions. Thus I hypothesize 
that future research could demonstrate how a “shame heuristic” or “blame heuristic” impacts 
in practice on people’s judgments of shamefulness or blameworthiness. Before turning to 
favourable evidence from other disciplinary areas, however, it is worth pausing to flesh out 
the picture drawn so far about the involvement of emotions in the execution of various 
epistemic tasks. The first question concerns the place of emotions in the relevant epistemic 
processes. The second issue throws light on the structure of the affective heuristics themselves.  
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So, first, the evidence cited is compatible with two different conceptions regarding how 
emotions are embedded in thought-processes. One of these is that emotions themselves 
function as heuristics. On this conception, people rely on their affective states directly to 
settle various factual or normative questions. As Sunstein puts it, people “consult their 
affective reactions” (Sunstein 2005, 568 – italics mine). In other words, the affective 
response will be a direct epistemic input into the deliberative process and will be used to 
justify one’s answer to the factual or normative question one is facing.  
 
However, on an alternative conception, the role of emotions in the relevant epistemic 
processes is causal rather than justificatory. On this conception, the use of certain heuristics 
is causally triggered by the subject’s affective response or state. The idea here is that 
emotional propensities incline or cause human beings to rely on certain kinds of 
heuristics. So, for example, the emotion of fear would not itself be a heuristic but rather 
part of the causal explanation why people rely on certain heuristics (e.g., availability) to 




The two conceptions do not seem to be mutually exclusive and both are compatible with 
the heuristics-model. However, in some cases emotions clearly function as heuristics and not 
just triggering causes of cognitive heuristic processes. For one thing, emotional responses can 
also follow upon evaluative judgments rather than precede them. For example, it is 
possible that I come to regard my action as morally objectionable after reflecting upon it 
and this reflection prompts my feelings of guilt. So emotions cannot always be 
triggering causes.
10
 In any case, there is also ample empirical evidence of direct justificatory 
reliance on affective heuristics.
11 
                                                        
9 How would this causal explanation go in this particular case? It could be the case that when people 
experience fear they generally tend to switch to heuristic thinking. This is because feeling the emotion creates 
a sense of emergency or at least urgency prompting the shift from the reflective to the heuristic thought-
process. Such causal explanations can be plausibly given for other emotions as well. They amount to general 
motivational explanations of the causal link between emotions and heuristics. However, consistent with this 
general link, there may also be specific causal connections between emotions and certain heuristics such as 
the availability heuristic as noted in the main body of the text above. For example, it could be argued that 
experiencing fear on a certain occasion increases the availability of past frightening events in one’s memory. 
This in turn could lead one to overestimate the significance of such events and lead one to conclusions one 
would reject upon reflection. For the discussion of a similar hypothesis about a putative causal link of this 
kind between experiences happiness and sadness, on the one hand, and specific heuristics, on the other, see 
Schwarz & Clore 1983, 518. 
10 Lazarus (1984) argues that emotions are always consequent upon such judgments. By contrast, the claim 
above is only that this is sometimes the case. Note that in those cases too when emotions are consequent upon 
judgments, the former can be said to play a heuristic role. Emotions have a back-up function in such cases 
serving to corroborate the evaluative judgment. 
11 See esp. Schwarz & Clore 1983 explicitly addressing the question whether affect merely prompts reliance 
on certain cognitive heuristics, e.g., the availability-heuristic, or has a direct “informational function” as well. 
The conclusion reached is that affective states can themselves function as heuristics (see esp. 518). Admittedly, 
the article cited focuses on moods rather than emotions, but there is no reason not to extend its conclusions to 
emotions proper as well. 
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Second, as regards the structure of emotional responses it is worth noting that the 
heuristics-model is intended to remain neutral in the dispute among judgmentalists, quasi-
judgmentalists, and anti-judgmentalists in the philosophy of emotion, i.e., regarding the 
question whether a given emotion necessarily involves a constitutive evaluative judgment 
or not (see D’Arms & Jacobson 2003). Further, it is also intended to remain neutral in the 
closely related debate in empirical emotion research as to whether emotions can occur 
without any accompanying cognitive activity at all (this is the debate about the already 
mentioned affective primacy hypothesis, see Prinz 2004, esp. 33-41).  
 
The heuristics-model need not be committed to either side in these debates. If emotions do 
not involve constitutive evaluative judgments, only representations of non-conceptual 
evaluative concerns (Tappolet 2000; D’Arms & Jacobson 2003; Döring 2010), then the 
epistemic role of emotions in thought-processes will be closer to that played by non-
inferential, non-conceptual perceptual inputs. On this picture, emotional responses form the 
heuristic basis of the evaluative judgments in ways relevantly similar to how we rely on the 
representational content of our perceptions when making perceptual judgments (Crane 
1992; Tappolet 2000; Döring 2010, 293).  
 
If, on the other hand, emotional responses necessarily involve the use of evaluative 
concepts, then it is plausible to treat these emotional responses as similar to 
straightforward cognitive judgments. No matter which structural account is right, however, 
emotional responses can be treated as providing reasons for beliefs and so can be plausibly 
taken to perform a heuristic function.  
 
3.2 Evolutionary accounts  
 
The heuristics-model sits well with standard evolutionary accounts of the adaptive value of 
emotions. Two important claims of such accounts are worth emphasizing here. First, that 
emotions — or at least basic emotions such as fear, anger, sadness or disgust — have 
evolved to deal with what Paul Ekman has called “fundamental life-tasks” (Ekman 1992). 
Emotions have helped to meet various challenges and threats human beings tended to face 
in their natural environments (Damasio 1995, 24). Further, emotions can enhance 
coordination among human beings and so have also helped humans to cooperate to better 
meet those environmental challenges together (Gibbard 1990; D’Arms 2005, 10).  
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Second, there is considerable agreement that phylogenetic history has hard-wired basic 
emotional propensities in human beings. What exactly has been hard-wired is subject to 
dispute. At the same time, it is safe to say that patterns of emotional responsiveness that we 
can observe human beings to display today have been fixed by our distant evolutionary past 
to a great extent (Tooby & Cosmides 1990; Damasio 1995; D’Arms and Jacobson 2003, 
138).  
 
These evolutionary accounts significantly increase the plausibility of the heuristics-model. 
Thus they offer the evolutionary background for what, according to the heuristics-model, 
emotions can do for us: provide quick-and-ready salient evaluative cues in standard 
situations when there is no time or no (perceived) need to undertake a more detailed 
cognitive assessment. But also these evolutionary accounts appear to converge with the 
heuristics-model as to what emotions cannot do for us. As phylogenetically hard-wired 
response-mechanisms, emotions are too rigid to track fine-grained evaluative features of 
situations which require us to make normative judgments or decisions. These positive and 
negative results already foreshadow the claims to be made in Sections 4 and 5 about the 





In his comprehensive account of experimental research findings on the neurobiology of 
emotions, Damasio (1994) argues that emotions are geared primarily towards tracking 
actual or potential changes in one’s own body. So even when tracking is conscious (which 
it may not be), the felt emotion need not involve any substantial cognitive-evaluative 
processing.
12 
This happens in the case of what Damasio calls “primary emotions” which 




It is true that there is a necessarily cognitive-evaluative component in the case of what 
Damasio calls “secondary emotions”. These are “cognitively sharpened” emotions 
personalized through the individual’s experiences in life. They can be typical (e.g., 
                                                        
12 At least it need not involve any sort of conscious, conceptual processing. As LeDoux (1995) makes it clear, 
however, this does not mean that emotions involve no processing whatsoever. They can still involve sensory 
information processing and “processing that occurs in complex association areas of cortex in the frontal lobes 
or hippocampus.” (225) LeDoux warns, however, that “just because emotion involves information processing 
this does not mean that emotion is cognition.” (226) 
13 For a detailed account of the neural organization of the fear system, see LeDoux 1995. 
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homesickness) or highly idiosyncratic (e.g., “tenure-denial anger”) (D’Arms & Jacobson 
2003).  
 
However, it is crucial to note two things here. First, in Damasio’s portrayal this cognitive-
evaluative process takes place prior to the emotional response. What happens is that a given 
situation, imagined or real, is cognitively evaluated and this cognitive evaluation triggers an 
emotional response whereby how one reacts emotionally to a certain cognitive evaluation 
will be in part determined by one’s acquired and to some extent idiosyncratic emotional 
dispositions. The upshot is that the secondary emotion is consequent upon and does not 
form part of the cognitive-evaluative process. Second, Damasio insists that even the 
secondary, personalized emotional dispositions are obtained under the influence of primary, 
that is, hard-wired emotional response mechanisms (Damasio 1994, 136; Damasio 1995, 22).  
 
It is safe to portray this data as consistent with the heuristics model. In fact, these findings 
help us draw a general picture about what emotions can and cannot do as an epistemic 
resource (even beyond our specific concern in this paper). What this picture reveals is that 
emotions are in general important ways of collecting information about changes in our 
own bodies and in the world and are crucial in translating this information into 
bodily reactions. But emotions subserve specific and to a large extent evolutionarily hard-
wired purposes. Because of this, emotions track a fairly restricted range of stimuli and so 
deliver only a special kind of information. Moreover, even the process by which emotions 
deliver that kind of information is relatively fixed and “pre-organized”. 
 
But what about Damasio’s celebrated thesis that emotion and reason are in some 
important sense inseparable (Damasio 1994)? This thesis is based on the repeatedly 
confirmed observation that the breakdown of basic emotional capacities due to some 
unambiguously localizable physical impairment of the brain is responsible for certain 
patients’ inability to reason and deliberate normally. It appears that emotional 
responsiveness and practical rationality go hand-in-hand. Doesn’t this finding contradict 
the heuristics-hypothesis after all?  
 
There is no reason to accept this negative conclusion in my view. For one thing, it does 
not follow from the correctness of the general claim about the involvement of emotions 
in reasoning processes that drawing on an occurrent emotion when making a particular 
decision or judgment in a given situation will always improve the rationality of that 
decision or judgment.
14 
So there is an important type-token distinction to be made here.
15
 
                                                        
14 As Damasio would certainly agree, see for example Damasio 1994, xii. 
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Even more importantly, however, Damasio’s thesis is perfectly compatible with the view 
that the contribution of emotions to reasoning processes is of a heuristic character. We 
need emotions and feelings (just as we need other, non-affective heuristics) because they 
frequently set us off in the right direction and make us do the right thing. Emotions can 
prepare the ground, as it were, for a more detailed cognitive assessment. 
 
In addition, these findings once again prefigure what I want to say in Sections 4 and 5 about the 
epistemic implications of the heuristic model and specifically about its incompatibility with 
EDT. While emotions contribute useful information about axiological properties, 
empirical data about the neural organization of emotions does not suggest that the 




4 The heuristics-model and the Epistemic 
Dependence Thesis 
 
It is time to take on the negative objective of this paper. This is to question the plausibility 
of EDT. In order to successfully accomplish this goal, we need to make EDT more precise 
first. Once we clarify what EDT says exactly, we will also be in a position to see why it is 
incompatible with the heuristics-model.  
 
EDT is understood throughout this paper to be the view that emotions are the highest court 
of appeal when axiological properties are at issue. This view seems to be explicitly 
endorsed by Hume, for example, in the quote already cited in the introduction.
17
 More 
generally, advocates of EDT assert all of the following: (i) the experience of a certain 
emotion furnishes a prima facie justification for claims about axiological properties, (ii) 
there may be reasons defeating such prima facie emotional justification (such as the 
presence of factors obscuring the normal operation of our emotional sensibilities), but (iii) 
the ultima facie justifiability of such axiological claims will be settled by appeal to 
affective responses (see for example Wiggins 1987; Tappolet 2000; D’Arms & Jacobson 
2011). 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
15 Russell (1992) argues persuasively for the need to distinguish between justificatory requirements for token 
emotional responses as opposed to justificatory requirements (if any) for general emotional dispositions. 
16 As Damasio would, once again, agree: “At their best, feelings point us in the proper direction, take us to the 
appropriate place in a decision-making space, where we may put the instruments of logic to good use.” 
Damasio 1994, xiii. 
17 “The final sentence […] which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious […] depends on some 
internal sense or feeling.” [my italics]. 
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What this view amounts to can be best seen when a proposition about some axiological 
property is contested, that is, when we ask questions such as “is this act really 
courageous?” or “is this movie really amusing?” and so on. As can be seen from (i)-(iii), 
advocates of EDT do not believe that emotional reactions are guaranteed to get matters 
right. It is granted by them that “fundamental evaluative disputes” (D’Arms and Jacobson 
2011, 605) can and will arise because we may have good reasons to question the reliability 
and trustworthiness of our emotional reactions. Still, at the end of the day these 
fundamental evaluative disputes will be resolved by consulting our relevant emotional 
reactions. 
 
Now, in order to see the implications of the heuristics-model with regard to the 
epistemology of value, it is helpful to make it clear that the heuristics-model does not take 
issue with claims (i) and (ii). In fact, the heuristics-model offers a robust and empirically 
supported explanation why we turn in many situations to our emotions to reach an initial 
evaluative assessment: heuristics are “fast and frugal”. Given how well heuristics perform 
in most situations we are likely to encounter, we have good prima facie reasons to trust and 
rely on the normative cues they deliver. The heuristics-model also recognizes the presence 
of factors that can adversely influence the performance of heuristics. There is no space to 
discuss these matters here, but these factors show a remarkable overlap with the reasons 
(sometimes also referred to as “defeaters”) sentimentalists identify for not trusting the 
deliverances of our sentiments on certain occasions (see esp. Tappolet 2000, 216-223 and 
D’Arms and Jacobson 2011, 598-605). 
 
Therefore, the heuristics-model is not incompatible with the view that emotions could be 
statistically more likely to be correct than evaluative beliefs. As noted, it has been found 
that in certain situations heuristics significantly outperform reflective thinking. It is an 
empirical and contingent matter — also depending on one’s profession, cultural 
background, and so on — how often one is likely to encounter situations in which 
affective heuristics will serve one well and how often one ends up in those special 
situations when the heuristic will mislead. 
 
It is only claim (iii) made by advocates of EDT that we have to reject if we accept the 
heuristics-model. However, this difference is crucial. The heuristics-model entails that the 
normative cues emotions deliver are always at best prima facie justifications for our 
axiological beliefs. To repeat, this should not worry us all that much as in most situations 
heuristics attributes overlap with genuine axiological properties and therefore the heuristic 
will yield the right result. But not always. Moreover, since heuristics employ the 
13 
mechanism of substitution as explained in Section 2 above, the divergence will not be 
contingent but rather systematic and predictable. That is, in situations in which affective 
heuristics do not perform well or do not perform at all, emotions will be systematically 
“more prone to forms and error and confusion” (pace D’Arms and Jacobson 2011, 611) 
than axiological beliefs arrived at by means of reflective thinking. The next section takes a 
closer look at those types of cases where heuristics break down. 
 
5 When heuristics break down 
 
Let us now consider celebrated cases from the philosophy of emotions literature: 
recalcitrant emotions, emotional responses (or the lack thereof) by agents complicit in 
collective wrongdoing, and emotional reactions in moral conflicts and dilemmas. I 
offer this discussion in support of both the negative and positive objectives of the 
paper. As regards the positive objective, I hope to demonstrate that the heuristics-
model provides a good explanation of the observable peculiarities of our emotional 
responses in these situations. As regards the negative objective, I hope to show that 
these cases also cast serious doubt on EDT in the highest-court-of-appeal sense 
clarified in the previous section. Finally, this discussion will also make it transparent 
why EDT in this sense is incompatible with the heuristics-model. 
 
The common denominator among the cases to be discussed is that the typical 
emotional reactions we experience in them offer little or no guidance as to how we 
should evaluate them. We have good reason to mistrust the deliverances of our 
emotional responses (Section 5.1), or else our emotional responses are either absent or 
weak (Section 5.2) or too confused (Section 5.3) to be of any epistemic assistance in 
our efforts to discover or learn about the axiological properties instantiated in those 
cases. This is why these cases are important to undermining EDT. At the same time, 
they also corroborate the heuristics-model. I will argue that this is because in all of 
these cases we come across enviroments in which affective heuristics cannot function 
well. The breakdown of affective heuristics well explains the unusual patterns of 
emotional reactions in them.  
 
But if the deliverances of our emotional sensibilities cannot be relied upon precisely 
when evaluation is at its most difficult, then EDT as the highest-court-of-appeal view 
of emotions has little bite. Moreover, if emotional sensibilities founder precisely when 
we would most need them, then we have reason to be more cautious about what 
14 
justificatory role we assign to them in less difficult cases as well. If so, then the lesson 
drawn from hard cases can be generalized to cases in which emotional responses and 




Recalcitrant emotions persist despite the subject’s judgment that there is no reason 
justifying the emotion. Hume’s original example is of someone who continues to be afraid of 
falling despite knowing that she is safe (Hume 1974). The phenomenon of recalcitrance is 
typically used to argue against judgmentalism about emotions (so for example in D’Arms & 
Jacobson 2003 and Döring 2010). 
 
Let us first see how the heuristics-model explains this phenomenon. In terms of this model, 
the recalcitrant emotion persists because the affective heuristic remains active despite its 
irrelevance in the given situation. What we are dealing with here is another case of an 
overgeneralized heuristic that fails to perform outside its customary and adaptive 
environment. The emotional reaction continues to function as a source of information 
despite the fact that that information, as all agree, has no basis in reality.
18
 So the 
misfiring of the affective heuristic in cases of recalcitrant emotions is comparable to the 
breakdown of non-affective heuristics in other contexts (described in Sunstein 2003; 
Sunstein 2005; Kahneman 2011). 
 
In addition, the heuristics-model explains why the emotional response occurs despite it 
being recognizably inadequate in the given situation. As we have seen emotional responses 
are evolutionarily tailored and neurophysiologically enabled to deliver information about 
familiar environments without requiring extensive cognitive-evaluative activity. In short, 
the survival value of emotions as heuristics lies in delivering such information 
spontaneously and almost automatically. Emotions become recalcitrant because the 
adaptive value of relying on emotions as a source of information outweighs the costs of 
the occasional misperformance of this resource in situations requiring reflective analysis (or 
at least this was the case at the decisive stage of our evolutionary history when our basic 
emotional capacities developed).  
 
                                                        
18 And thus we have another demonstration of the general claim repeatedly made in Kahneman 2011 (364, 
etc.) that the performance of the non-reflective cognitive “System 1”, of which affective heuristics form an 
important part, is not “reality-bound.”  
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As noted above, the phenomenon of recalcitrance is an important weapon in the arsenal of 
anti-judgmentalists. If emotions can persist in spite of one’s evaluative judgments, then 
such judgments can hardly be said to be constitutive of emotions. It is more plausible to 
construe emotions as “the product of some discrete evaluative mechanism” (D’Arms & 
Jacobson 2003, 141). The suggestion made here to use the heuristics-model to explain the 
phenomenon of recalcitrance is in partial agreement with such alternative accounts of 
recalcitrance. But there are a number of important differences. 
 
The first advantage of the present suggestion is that it offers an empirically-plausible 
solution without having to commit itself to either the judgmentalist or anti-judgmentalist 
side in the debate whether evaluative judgments are constitutive of emotions or not (see 
Section 3.1). Another advantage is that one need not limit the phenomenon of 
recalcitrance to only a restricted range of basic emotions (e.g., fear, anger). Arguably, such a 
limitation is implausible because even complex and idiosyncratic emotions can be recalcitrant. 
Thus secondary emotions such as recalcitrant homesickness, tenure-rage, or religious awe 
are quite possible, and I think not uncommon (pace D’Arms & Jacobson 2003, 142).
19
 The 
heuristics-model can handle cases of recalcitrance for secondary emotions as well 
construing them as sources of evaluative information.  
 
Thirdly, unlike some of the alternative accounts of recalcitrance, which ignore this point, the 
heuristics-model explicitly recognizes the fact that recalcitrant emotions can make us 
believe and do the right thing, and so it can be rational to rely on them, even against the 
contradictory evaluative judgment. This can happen because the evaluative judgment can 
be mistaken and can point one in the wrong direction. Huckleberry Finn’s ultimate 
refusal to turn his friend Jim in, despite his best judgment to the contrary, is a vivid 
illustration of this possibility (Döring 2010).  
 
But the most important issue is that the phenomenon of recalcitrant emotions should also 
give pause to advocates of the EDT. If emotions can persist despite our best judgment that 
they are wholly unjustified in some cases, then it is hard to see on what grounds emotions 
should be stipulated to be the highest court of appeal in matters axiological. In my view, 
this point is not sufficiently appreciated by anti-judgmentalist advocates of EDT. Quite 
simply, the difficulty for these authors is that they want to be able to rule out some 
                                                        
19 The reason for the confusion on this point in D’Arms & Jacobson 2003 (an article to which this paper is of 
course very much indebted otherwise) is that they misdescribe the relevant belief. For example, the relevant 
belief in the case of homesickness is not that one is “really at home”, but rather that it is “best to be at home” or 
some other evaluative belief like that. In other words, there is confusion here between the “material object” and 
the “formal object” of the emotion (see Mulligan 2010, 478f. on this distinction). Once the confusion is 
cleared up, it is easy to see that recalcitrant homesickness is very much possible. 
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recalcitrant emotions as inappropriate, but it seems hard to do this without ultimately 
invoking reflective judgments to settle matters of justifiability.
20
 The crucial issue is not 
whether such judgments necessarily form part of emotional responses, nor whether these 
emotional responses can be right (which of course they can be), but rather where we 
should turn to when the appropriateness of such responses is in question.  
 
My interim conclusion drawn from the discussion of recalcitrance is that the heuristics-
model is capable of explaining both how emotional responses can so often be right: 
affective heuristics tend to work well in familiar contexts. At the same time, unlike the 
anti-judgmentalist sentimentalist framework, this model does not deny us the resources to 
assess the appropriateness of such affective responses: the deliverances of affective 
heuristics are monitored and corrected by reflective thought.  
 
5.2 Collective action 
 
This interim conclusion is further supported by those cases which are normatively and 
morally significant but tend to be marked by the universal (or nearly universal) absence of 
emotional reactions. Individual reactions of agents complicit in collectively brought about 
harms present an important type of example. Thus in many cases which involve harm due 
to the aggregation of actions by several people — think of environmental pollution, 
multinational corporations or intergovernmental organizations — contributors tend to 
experience no guilt feelings. Or at least, the guilt they experience is much less intense (see 
Kutz 2000) than if they had caused the same kind of harm alone or in small groups.  
 
Now note, first, that the heuristics-model can offer a plausible explanation of the changing 
pattern of guilt feelings in such cases of collective action, that is, why guilt tends to be less 
intense or entirely absent. Given its evolutionary origins and biological underpinnings 
discussed earlier, we can expect the guilt-heuristics to be geared primarily towards one’s 
own actions in relatively uncomplicated, familiar situations. These tend to involve only a 
few and evaluatively salient features, thus paradigmatically, a single action of visible 
impact and short duration by one agent causing harm to one or few victims. 
 
And this is indeed what seems to happen in cases in which a large number of people 
contribute to bringing about some collective harm. The more distant the actual situation is 
from the simple paradigm, the more likely it becomes that participants will feel no guilt at 
                                                        
20 Which is precisely what D’Arms and Jacobson do for example, see D’Arms & Jacobson 2003, 144-145. 
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all, or their guilt will be less intense. That is, the higher the number of agents participating 
in the collective action, the longer the duration of the action, the less visible and 
physically proximate the impact, and the more distributed the harm over many victims, 




On the other hand, this finding about complicitous guilt (or the lack of it) casts further 
doubt on EDT. We typically believe that contribution to collectively brought about harms 
is often culpable and in many cases as bad as individual wrongdoing. Both consequentialist 
(Parfit 1984) and non-consequentialist (Kutz 2000) authors agree on this point. In any case, 
although there are divergent views on the exact degree and source of culpability in such 
cases, it is generally agreed that culpability does not correlate with the kind of factors 
listed above such as duration, physically proximity, etc. which, however, significantly 
impact on whether guilt is experienced or not. If so, then once again we have a morally 
significant type of situation in which the presence/absence and intensity of an emotion 




5.3 Hard cases 
 
I now want to argue that EDT is inconsistent with our emotional responses in situations of 
moral conflict and related problematic cases. At the same time, the heuristics-model 
provides a reasonable explanation of typical emotional response patterns in such situations.  
 
Consider Sophie’s Choice (Greenspan 1983) which many argue is the purest example of a 
genuine moral dilemma. The basic set up of the case is as follows. Sophie receives this offer: 
“choose between your two children, otherwise both will be killed”. Sophie chooses one of 
her children and so only one child is killed.  
 
                                                        
21  This prediction is consistent with the role of affect observed in other contexts as well. Take, for example, 
the explanation of the so-called “mere exposure effect”, that is, an account of why mere repetition of a stimulus 
generates mildly positive affect towards that stimulus. As Robert Zajonc, who discovered this effect, puts it: 
“The consequences of repeated exposures benefit the organism in its relations to the immediate animate and 
inanimate environment.” (quoted in Kahneman 2011, 67 – my italics). 
22 Further support for this conclusion could come from cases of vicarious feelings of guilt as when a citizen of 
Germany feels guilty about the Holocaust today. A possible complication is that these may well turn out to be 
feelings of shame rather than guilt – and such shame, some people would say (in my view incorrectly), is 
appropriate while guilt is not. In any case, it has been argued that the basis for such emotions felt on behalf of 
others is a perception of similarity between the other person and oneself and a resulting sense of solidarity (see 
Feinberg 1970, 64). If this is correct, then the phenomenon of vicarious emotions could also be read as 
confirming the heuristics-model of emotions: once again, what prompts the emotion are morally-speaking 
contingent factors such as physical proximity, similarity and subjective salience from the first-person 
perspective. 
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Few would deny that Sophie, and most people in Sophie’s place, will feel something more or 
less resembling ordinary guilt feelings. However, we can also expect Sophie to experience 
intense inner conflict and persistent doubt (McConnell 1978). Again, I think the heuristics-
model offers a good explanation of typical emotional responses in such situations 
including the experience of moral doubt and inner conflict which is likely to manifest 
itself simultaneously with the emotion. 
 
As with the phenomenon of recalcitrance, the basic idea is once again that the affective 
heuristics has not been “designed” to deal with such extreme and difficult cases such as 
Sophie’s. Although well outside its familiar environment, the affective heuristic 
nevertheless continues to function as an information channel. In fact, given how deeply 
the situation must affect Sophie personally as a mother and as a moral agent, it is not 
surprising that the affective response will also be particularly intense. The heuristics-
model predicts that what happens in cases like Sophie’s is that the continued reliance on 
guilt as an epistemic resource used to evaluate her actions conflicts with her non-
affectively-based beliefs regarding the case. The presence of guilt(-like) feelings continues to 
suggest to her that she has done something culpably wrong, but she will also entertain beliefs 
conflicting with the affectively-based epistemic input. 
 
At the same time, the peculiar character of emotional responses in moral conflicts of this 
kind creates further difficulties for EDT. The first difficulty is that it remains 
fundamentally ambiguous what Sophie really feels — both to herself and to external 
observers. Tellingly, even friends of moral dilemmas sometimes speak of Sophie’s emotional 




Nor is Sophie’s an isolated case. There are many other examples which lack the special 
dilemmatic structure of Sophie’s choice but pose the same kind of challenge. Consider, for 
example, the case of the Faultless Truck Driver, that is, the driver who runs over a child 
through absolutely no fault of his (Williams 1976). Bernard Williams says that this 
driver will feel differently from any spectator. This is probably true in most cases and 
it is probable too that the emotion will feel like something similar to guilt. However, 
once again, it is unclear what the truck driver will feel exactly, but quite clear that the 
truck driver’s feelings will be conflicted and accompanied by doubt. 
 
                                                        
23 Compare and contrast Williams 1973a and Marcus 1980, and see also Gowans 1987, 15. Note that 
McConnell (1978), an outspoken opponent of moral dilemmas, also describes the relevant kind of emotional 
experience in a moral dilemma as regret. The relevant emotion is sometimes also labelled as remorse, but in 
this context remorse is probably meant to be synonymous with guilt.  
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The problem in these cases is that the emotional response cannot be used as evidence in 
the evaluation of the relevant situation because one could only rely on the emotional 
response if one knew how to classify the emotion. But this remains unclear both from the first-
person and third-person perspectives. My point of course is not that these situations cannot 
be evaluated (if that were the case, EDT would be false anyway). Rather, the point is that 
focusing on the emotional responses will not deliver the answers to these questions. 
 
Second, whatever emotional responses these situations have given rise to, these emotions are 
characteristically accompanied by doubt and inner conflict as just noted. The basic problem 
then is: how could such amorphous, conflicted and doubt-ridden emotions provide useful 
information regarding the evaluative properties of the relevant situations?
24
 But if the 
deliverances of our emotional sensibilities cannot be relied upon precisely when 
evaluation is at its most difficult, then why should we hang onto a view of emotional 
responses as capable of settling evaluative disputes? 
 
Well, perhaps the cases just discussed are just too hard or too special to warrant general 
conclusions. So let us turn to less difficult situations. 
 
5.4 Central cases 
 
What about central cases then? Do they support my skepticism about EDT and my 
optimism about the heuristics-model? 
 
After all, I have granted that in most familiar environments affective heuristics do 
converge with the non-affective assessment of the situation. It may therefore be objected that 
the cases discussed above are only marginally relevant to assessing how well emotional 
responses track the presence of evaluative properties. For one thing, some of the problem 
cases mentioned above are artificially constructed and are very unlikely to occur in real life. 
Furthermore, it may be objected that nobody who subscribes to EDT has ever claimed that 
emotions would always be absolutely reliable, let alone infallible, and never fuzzy or 
equivocal.  
 
                                                        
24 Incidentally, this worry looms large for friends of moral dilemmas as well, i.e., for those who think that 
there can be situations in which no course of action is all-things-considered justifiable. What is perhaps the 
most influential argument for the existence of moral dilemmas is at bottom sentimentalist and runs as follows: 
since Sophie would feel guilt appropriately no matter which course of action she were to choose (sacrificing 
one child, or the other, or not accepting the offer letting both die), she is in a moral dilemma (see Williams 
1973a, Marcus 1980). However, this emotion-based argument for moral dilemmas only goes through provided 
that what Sophie feels really is guilt. But how can we be sure that this is indeed the case? 
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In response to this objection, it should be noted first of all that the plausibility of the 
heuristics-model is not undermined by the convergence between affective heuristics and 
reflective judgments in “easy” cases. Quite the contrary. The convergence between 
evaluative information produced by affective heuristics and straightforward evaluative 
judgments is exactly what the heuristics-model predicts. To repeat, affective heuristics 
frequently “get it right”, especially when operating in their natural habitats.  
 
The second part of the response to the objection consists in questioning the dialectical 
significance of central cases. It is questionable what we can learn from central cases 
precisely because they are marked by the convergence of emotional and reflective 
responses. Hard cases serve a crucial methodological purpose because they are essential to 





No doubt, many will find this response wanting. The most pressing worry is that this 
response underestimates the significance of central cases. Granted, in the special situations 
discussed earlier emotions are not infallible and perhaps not even moderately reliable guides 
to the presence and character of axiological properties. But this only shows, so the 
complaint, that we have to add certain qualifications to EDT. These qualifications are 
familiar from dispositionalist theories of secondary qualities. Thus we should perhaps read 
EDT as saying something like this: under normal circumstances and for normal subjects 
emotions will be the highest court of appeal for the justification of axiological claims (call 
this version ceteris paribus EDT).  
 
This qualification, however, cannot rescue EDT. For one thing, not all the examples 
discussed above are exotic or rare. For instance, the phenomenon of changing emotional 
response patterns in cases of complicity in collective harms discussed in Section 5.2 above is 
a very common occurrence. Apart from the issue of frequency, it should also be noted that 
there appears to be nothing abnormal about the agents concerned even in the special cases 
discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.3. People tend to agree, for example, that it is normal for 
Sophie or the truck driver to feel conflicted and confused. By the same token, emotional 
recalcitrance is an ordinary occurrence that does not indicate a malfunctioning of one’s 
emotional sensibilities. Quite the contrary, emotional recalcitrance is a product of the 
normal functioning of the neurophysiology of the affective system as we have seen earlier. 
 
                                                        
25 A positive implication of all this is that we can continue to treat hard cases as important for moral 
theorizing. Thus Sunstein (2005) is wrong to discount exotic cases such as Sophie’s Choice as largely 
irrelevant to ethics.  
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To see what is at stake here we can draw an analogy between cases where our emotional 
sensibilities fail to guide our evaluations and perceptual illusions (e.g., the stick appearing 
bent in water). The latter are of course predictable and systematic and will be experienced by 
normal subjects under ordinary circumstances. But of course the fact that the stick is 
perceived to be bent by normal subjects under ordinary circumstances should not be as 
justification for claims about genuine properties of the stick. By the same token, only 
because some emotional response is typically displayed by “normal” subjects under “normal 
circumstances” that emotional response should not play a special role in the justification of 




To see what is at stake here, consider this last bit of empirical evidence. In a recent 
experiment a marked correlation was found between the endorsement of utilitarian solutions 
to situations of moral conflict such as the Trolley Problem, on the one hand, and a set of 
abnormal psychological traits such as emotionally callousness and psychopathic 
personality, on the other (Bartels & Pizarro 2011). If the ceteris paribus version of EDT 
was correct, we would have to take this experiment as favouring a non-utilitarian moral 
theory.  
 
Needless to say, for all we know, utilitarianism may be the wrong ethical theory after all. If 
so, then the experiment could indeed be cited as evidence that moral emotions converge 
with correct ethical judgments — at least most of the time. But the decisive question as 
regards the ceteris paribus version of EDT is another: can the experiment be cited 
as evidence that utilitarianism is the wrong ethical theory? Arguing in this order would 
surely be mistaken.  
 
To summarize, even in central cases heuristics work by substitution. So the decisive question 
is how to explain convergence in central cases. If the heuristics-model is right, then the 
explanation of convergence is that heuristic attributes and target attributes coincide in 
central cases. This is not surprising: after all, this is precisely why heuristics can be 
evolutionarily adaptive. At the same time, heuristics are triggered by an ersatz property 
even in these cases. Consequently, heuristics can only yield approximations. The 
divergence between the heuristic-based approximations and reflective thought processes will 
be exposed by focusing on the kinds of hard cases discussed earlier. 
 
                                                        
26 Unless of course we are prepared to give up realism about axiological properties. But that is not the way 




Bernard Williams complained that contemporary moral philosophy had too little to say 
about the emotions (Williams 1973b, 207). First, there would be more to say about the 
relevance of emotions to the adequate analysis of moral concepts. And second, there would 
be more to say too about emotions themselves being potential objects of moral assessment. 
In closing, I want to indicate that despite superficial appearances the model is actually 
amenable to meeting these two Williamsian desiderata.  
 
Even if emotions are heuristics, it is perfectly reasonable to say that “one ought to feel so and 
so” in a given situation, or even that anyone “who is not capable of a certain kind of emotion 
ought to be despised”. As I have emphasized throughout this paper, the fact that emotions 
function as heuristics does not mean that they are not useful. Indeed, in many cases they 
are indispensable. Emotions can alert us to salient evaluative features of a situation before 
reflective assessment could even begin. Attempting to “think it through” may be 
counterproductive or even disastrous. 
 
It also remains true that some moral concepts are bound up with emotions. I cannot 
address this issue in any detail here, but consider guilt or blame by way of example. These 
emotions are, among other things, unpleasant, sometimes tormenting. Consequently, it is 
for first-order moral norms to settle under what conditions the torment of guilt or blame can 
be undeserved. 
 
I conclude that it would be wrong to dispute that emotions are an important source of 
knowledge about value. Affective heuristics are often useful and sometimes 
indispensable. What I have objected to is the idea that emotions would constitute an 
epistemically superior or even privileged source of knowledge about value in the sense that 
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